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Multiple Criminal Representation Examined:
Holloway v. Arkansas
The United States Supreme Court in Holloway v. Arkansas'
addressed sixth amendment issues arising from representation of more
than one criminal defendant by the same attorney in the same judicial
proceeding. The conflicts of interest possible in such a situation present the
danger that one or more defendants may be deprived of their sixth
amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel. The sixth
amendment states in pertinent part that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions the
accused shall enjoy the right ... to have the Assistance of Counsel for
his defence.",2 This guarantee, which has been read as a guarantee of the
effective assistance of counsel, 3 had been dealt with only once before by the
Supreme Court in the context of multiple representation.
Holloway is an example of a case in which multiple representation
resulted in the denial of the effective assistance of counsel. The Supreme
Court's decision is significant because of the frequency with which criminal
defendants are jointly represented and because of the inherent dangers in
such a practice.5 The decision should aid lower courts. It sets some ground
rules and implicitly indicates future guidelines in an area of criminal
practice in which rules have traditionally been unclear. Chief Justice
Burger's majority opinion, however, resolves only some of the problems
presented by multiple representation 7 and thus uniformity in dealing with
such representation cannot be obtained from this decision alone.
This Case Comment will discuss the issues resolved and those left
unresolved by Holloway. It will attempt to show the broad ramifications of
this case upon the sixth amendment guarantee of effective assistance of
counsel as it applies to multiple representation. To this end the narrow
holdings as well as the implications of the decision will be discussed. This
Case Comment will focus on the crucial issues in Holloway, including the
nature of the inquiry required when an attorney contends that a conflict
1. 435 U.S. 475 (1978).
2. U.S. CONsT. amend. VI.
3. "It has long been recognized that the right to counsel is the right to the effective assistance of
counsel." McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n.14 (1970).
4. Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60 (1942).
5. A conflict of interest can arise at any stage of a criminal proceeding. See cases collected in J.
COOK, CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED-TRIAL RIGiTS § 46 (1974 & Supp. 1978); Geer,
Representation of Multiple Criminal Defendants: Conflicts of Interest and the Professional
Responsibilities of the Defense Attorney, 62 MINN. L. REV. 119, 125-35 (1978); Annot., 34 A.L.R. 3d
470 (1970).
6. Several recent law review articles have commented upon the conflicting approaches used
throughout the federal courts to deal with multiple representation problems. See, e.g., Hyman, Joint
Representation of Multiple Defendants in a Criminal Trial, 5 HoFsTRA L REv. 315, 318 (1977);
Comment, Conflict of Interests in Multiple Representation of Criminul Co-Defendants, 68 J. Citist. L.
& CRIMIINOLOGY 226, 229 (1977).
7. Two issues were specifically reserved by the Court in Holloway, 435 U.S. at 483-84. See text
accompanying notes 165-82 infra.
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exists, the role of the harmless error rule in appeals of multiple
representation cases, the implications of statements in*Holloway regarding
waiver, and the effect of the Court's decision upon public defender offices.
Emphasis also will be placed upon the ethical considerations involved in
representing more than one defendant in the same trial.
I. THE FACTS AND HOLDINGS OF Holloway
In Holloway three defendants (Winston Holloway, Ray Lee Welch,
and Gary Don Campbell) were charged with robbery of a Little Rock,
Arkansas restaurant and with the rape of two female restaurant
employees. They were jointly tried8 and all were represented by the same
public defender. The public defender, Harold L. Hall, soon after his
appointment by the trial court, moved for severance and for appointment
of separate counsel. These motions alleged only that the defendants had
indicated the possibility of a conflict of interest.9 The motions were denied
by the trial judge after a hearing.
These objections were renewed before the jury was empaneled, and
again at trial after the prosecution had rested its case. The objections to
joint representation focused upon counsel's inability to cross-examine10
and protect the other codefendants' interests in the event an individual
defendant chose to testify." These requests for appointment of separate
counsel were denied by the trial judge, who strongly believed that joint
representation in this case was not improper. 2 Against their attorney's
recommendations all three defendants eventually testified, thereby
creating the problem feared by defense counsel.' 3 The alibi testimony given
by each of the three defendants did not implicate the others, although there
were some clear indications of conflicting interests during their
testimony.14 Guilty verdicts were returned by the jury on all counts. 15
On appeal to the Arkansas Supreme Court, 16 Ihe defendants claimed
in part that the joint representation had denied them the effective
8. In Arkansas (as in many otherjurisdictions) joinder of defendants lies within the diseretlon of
the court, except in capital cases when the defendant can obtain severance upon demand. ARK. STAT,
ANN. § 43-1802 (1964).
9. Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 477 (1978).
10. The trial judge at one point stated that defense counsel had no right to cross-examine his own
witness. Id. at 480. This result was apparently caused by evidentiary rules concerning sponsorship that
limit cross-examination and impeachment of one's own witness. See MCCORMICK'S HANDBOOK ON T118
LAW OF EVIDENCE § 38 (2d ed. 1972); 3A J. WIGMOaE, EVIDENCE §§ 896-918 (Rev. ed, J. Chadbourne
1970 & Supp. 1977).
11. 435 U.S. at 479.
12. The transcript of the original trial, quoted extensively by the Sipreme Court, Indicates the
judge's lack of receptiveness in dealing with defense counsel's claim of conflict. Id. at 479-80,
13. Much of the testimony given by the defendants was unguided because both Hall and the trial
court were aware of defense counsel's obligation not to assist in the presentation of perjured testimony.
Id. at 480 n.4.
14. For example, one defendant, Holloway, interrupted a codefendant's testimony to ask the
trial judge if he could object. Id. at 480.
15. Id. at 481.
16. Holloway v. State, 260 Ark. 250, 539 S.W.2d 435 (1976).
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assistance of counsel. The court upheld the convictions, finding no conflict
sufficient to justify the defendants' claim of reversible error. The Arkansas
court stated that "[t]he record presents no basis from which this court can
find that separate counsel should have been appointed."' 7 From this same
record the United States Supreme Court reversed and remanded the cases
of all three defendants.'3
The Supreme Court in Holloway set forth two holdings without
supportive discussion and, with greater explanation, established two
others. It noted in passing that joint representation is not per se
unconstitutional 19 and that a defendant may waive the right to have an
attorney-who is free from conflicts of interest.20 The Court fully discussed
two primary aspects of its decision. The Court held that a trial judge has a
duty either to inquire into the existence of an alleged conflict of interest or
to appoint separate counsel whenever an attorney objects in a timely
fashion to continued joint representation. 2 ' The Court also held that the
failure to discharge this responsibility would result in an automatic
reversal on appeal, regardless of whether the defendants had shown
prejudice to their defenses resulting from the judge's failure.2 2 These two
holdings could greatly alter past practices within this area, because the
courts had not acted uniformly in dealing with similar circumstances prior
to Holloway.
II. BACKGROUND
Joinder of defendants in criminal cases has traditionally been
permitted in most jurisdictions, if not universally encouraged.23 The
predominant view of this common practice deems it a necessity in terms of
judicial economy. 24 The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure,25 state
rules,26 and the American Bar Association Standards Relating to
17. Id. at 260, 539 S.W.2d at 441.
18. 435 U.S. at 491.
19. Id. at 482.
20. Id. at 483 n.5.
21. Id. at 484.
22. Id. at 488.
23. One notable exception to this rule requiring joinder of defendants is the State of Vermont,
which gives the defendant an absolute right to severance upon request. See Langrock, Joint Trials: A
Short Lesson From Little Vermont, 9 CRiM. L. BULL. 612 (1973).
24. "The traditional rationale ofjoinder of offenses and defenses is that ofconserving the time
lost in duplicating the efforts of the prosecuting attorney, and possibly his witnesses, and ofjudges and
court officials." AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, STANDARDS RELATING TO THE ADMINISTRATION OF
CRIMINAL JUSTICE, COMPILATION 285 (1974) [hereinafter cited as ABA STANDARDS].
25. FED. R. CRiM. P. 8(b) provides:
Joinder of Defendants. Two or more defendants may be charged in the same indictment or
information if they are alleged to have participated in the same act or transaction or in the
same series of acts or transactions constitutingan offense or offenses. Such defendants may be
charged in one or more counts together or separately and all of the defendants need not be
charged in each count.
26. Eg., OHIO R. CRIM. P. 8(b), which is patterned after Federal Rule 8(b) quoted at note 25
supra.
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Criminal Justice 27 all permit joinder in many varied situations. The most
common situation giving rise to joint trials involves two or more
defendants who allegedly have participated in the same crime or
28conspiracy.
When two or more indigent defendants have been charged together it
is common for the trial court to appoint one attorney to represent all.29
Joint representation may come about for nonindigents also, because many
wish to retain joint counsel for financial or other reasons. Sharing
counsel may sometimes be advantageous, 3 but this convenience is often
more than offset by the dangers inherent in joint representation,32 which
probably are not perceived by the defendants themselves. a A latent or
27. ABA STANDARDS, JOINDER AND SEVERANCE, supra note 24, § 1.2 (1968) provides:
Joinder of defendants
Two or more defendants may be joined in the same charge:
(a) when each of the defendants is charged with accountability for each offense included;
(b) when each of the defendants is charged with conspiracy and some of the defendants are
also charged with one or more offenses alleged to be in furtherance of the conspiracy; or(c) when even if conspiracy is not charged and all of the defendants are not charged in each
count, it is alleged that the several offenses charged:
(i) were part of a common scheme or plan; or
(ii) were so closely connected in respect to time, place, and occasion that it would be
difficult to separate proof of one charge from proof of the others.
28. See Note, Joint and Single Trials Under Rules 8 and 14 of the Federal Rules of Crnlnnal
Procedure, 74 YALE L.J. 553 (1965), for a discussion of the many different instances in which pr Judiec
can arise from the joinder of defendants.
29. Justice Powell in his dissenting opinion in Holloway aired some reasons why separate
attorneys are not immediately appointed, when he stated:
Each addition of a lawyer in the trial of multiple defendants presents increased opportunities
for delay in setting the trial date, in disposing of pretrial motions, in selecting thejury, and in
the conduct of the trial itself. Additional lawyers also may tend to enhance the possibility of
trial errors.
435 U.S. at 494 n.2 (Powell, J., dissenting).
30. A surprising number of cases concern joint counsel who are retained and not appointed, The
courts seem more reluctant to find a conflict when counsel is retained. See, e.g., United States V.
Alvarez, 580 F.2d 1251, 1255-56 (5th Cir. 1978); Larry Buffalo Chief v. South Dakota, 425 F.2d 271
(8th Cir. 1970). See also cases collected in J. CooK, supra note 5, § 46 n.14.
31. The Supreme Court expressly recognized this when it stated: "[lin some cases multiple
defendants can appropriately be represented by one attorney; indeed in some cases, certain advantages
might accrue from joint representation. In Mr. Justice Frankfurter's view: 'Joint representation is a
means of insuring against reciprocal recrimination. A common defense often gives strength against it
common attack.'" 435 U.S. at 482-83 (citation omitted).
32. There exists an "inherent danger" in all joint trials that the evidence will be viewed
cumulatively, "rather than on the basis of the quantum of evidence relating to each defendant," United
States v. Fuel, 583 F.2d 978, 988 (8th Cir. 1978). Added to these problems are the dangers of
antagonistic defenses, a guilty plea taken by only one of the defendants and problems with cross-
examination. See Hyman, supra note 6, at 316.
33.
It would be a rare defendant who could intelligently decide whether his interests will be
properly served by counsel who also represents another defendant. However parallel his
interests may seem to be with those ofa codefendant, the course of events in the prosecution
of the case, the taking of a guilty plea, or the conduct of the trial may radically change the
situation so as to impair the ability of counsel to represent the defendant most effectively.
Even defense counsel, who all too frequently are not adequately informed regarding the
evidence available against their clients, may not be in a position tojudge whether a conflict of
interest between their clients may develop.
United States v. Carrigan, 543 F.2d 1043, 1058 (2d Cir. 1976) (Lumbard, J., concurring).
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unrecognized conflict can arise at any stage of a criminal prosecution.
The danger of a conflict is so great that the American Bar Association
recommends that joint representation not be accepted in the ordinary
course of practice. In some circumstances, continued representation of
multiple defendants may constitute unprofessional conduct.3 6 These
dangers have not led to the discontinuance of multiple representation; to
the contrary, it remains a common and accepted practice. Judicial
convenience and demands upon the public purse have led to this policy
choice.
The sixth amendment guarantee of the right to the effective assistance
of counsel first began to develop into a meaningful protection within the
federal courts in the 1930s.3 7 It is now considered one of the most vital
protections afforded a criminal defendant,8 to be dispensed with only
upon a knowing and intelligent waiver by the accused.3 9 The multiple
representation case of Glasser v. United States40 was decided in 1942
against the backdrop of the evolving concept of effective assistance of
counsel.
Glasser was the only Supreme Court case prior to Holloway to deal
directly with the issues surrounding multiple representation. All of the
many appellate decisions in this area have their roots in this decision. The
Supreme Court, in that opinion, established that conflicting loyalties in
multiple representation cases could lead to impairment of a defendant's
right to effective assistance of counsel. The Court stated in Glasser that
34. See sources cited at note 5 supra.
35. ABA STANDARDS, THE DEFENSE FUNCTION, supra note 24, § 3.5(b) (1971) provides.
(b) Except for preliminary matters such as initial hearings or applications for bail,a lawyer
or lawyers who are associated in practice should not undertake to defend more than one ofthie
defendants in the same criminal case if the duty to one ofthe defendants may conflict with the
duty to another. The potential for conflict of interest in representing multiple defendants is so
grave that ordinarily a lawyer should decline to act for more than one of several co-
defendants except in unusual situations when, after careful investigation, it is clear that no
conflict is likely to develop and when the several defendants give an informed consent to such
multiple representation. In some instances, as defined in the Code of Professional
Responsibility, accepting or continuing employment by more than one defendant in the same
criminal case will constitute unprofessional conduct.
36. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY D.R. 5-105(B) and (C) contain the primary
ethical restraints on this practice.
37. Effectiveness of counsel was first examined in the due process case of Powell v. Alabama, 287
U.S. 45 (1932). A guarantee of effective assistance of counsel was extended to all federal felony trials
under the sixth amendment in Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938), and the sixth amendment was
madc applicable to state proceedings in Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). SeeStephans, The
Assistance of Counsel and the Warren Court: Post-Gideon Developments in Perspectie, 74 Dicm. L
REV. 193 (1970), for further background.
38. "Of all the rights that an accused person has, the right to be represented by counsel is by far
the most pervasive, for it affects his ability to assert any other rights he may have." Schaefer,
Federalism and State Criminal Procedure, 70 HARV. L. REv. 1, 8 (1956). See also Chapman v.
California, 386 U.S. 18,23 (1966). Holloway discusses Chapman and other cases reflecting upon the
importance of counsel. 435 U.S. at 489.
39. See Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458,464 (1938); Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748
(1970).
40. 315 U.S. 60 (1942).
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"[t]he 'assistance of counsel' guaranteed by the sixth amendment
contemplates that such assistance be untrammeled and unimpaired by a
court order requiring that one lawyer shall simultaneously represent
conflicting interests. If the right to the assistance of counsel means less than
this, a valued constitutional safeguard is substantially impaired."'4 The
Court, in language that had been subject to much controversy42 prior to
Holloway, added that "[t]he right to have the assistance of counsel is too
fundamental and absolute to allow courts to indulge in nice calculations as
to the amount of prejudice arising from its denial. 43
In the more than thirty-five years since Glasser many issues arose
concerning its meaning. The facially simple and direct decision in Glasser
became the subject of varying interpretations.44 The decision was
ambiguous in that it did not set out a definitive standard establishing to
what degree a conflict of interest must be shown in order to warrant
appointment of separate counsel.45 Some courts have thus held that a
possibility of a conflict was enough to warrant separate defense attorneys,
while other courts have required a greater factual showing of conflict. 46
Once a conflict of constitutional dimension was found, appellate courts
took differing approaches. Some required automatic reversal,47 while
others, seizing upon contrary language in Glasser,48 required a showing of
prejudice, insisting upon a demonstration that the conflict of interest was
not harmless error.49
Differing standards also arose from language within the Glasser
opinion concerning a trial judge's responsibilities within this area of
multiple representation. 0 Some federal circuits used this to support
imposition of an affirmative duty upon trial judges to inquire into possible
41. Id. at 70.
42. See Note, Criminal Codefendants and the Sixth Amendment. The Case for Separate
Counsel, 58 GEo. L.J. 369, 379 (1969). See also text accompanying notes 95-97 infra.
43. 315 U.S. at 76.
44. E.g., Waltz, Inadequacy of Trial Defense Representation as a Groundfor Post-Convictlon
Relief in Criminal Cases, 59 Nw. U.L. REV. 289,334 (1964); Comment, Conflict offinterests: Multiple
Defendants Represented by a Single Court-Appointed Counsel, 74 DicK, L. Rev. 241 (1969),
45. The Court's language was very imprecise. At one point it stated that "[i]rrcspective of any
conflict of interest, the additional burden of representing unother party may conceivably impair
counsel's effectiveness." 315 U.S. at 75.
46. See text accompanying notes 166-69 infra.
47. See note 95 infra.
48. While the Supreme Court stated that no "nice calculations" of prejudice were to be made, see
text accompanying note 43 supra, it also set forth something resembling a harmless error test When it
stated:
In all cases the constitutional safeguards are to be jealously preserved for the benefit of the
accused, but especially is this true where the scales ofjustice may be delicately poised between
guilt and innocence. Then error, which under some circumstances would not be ground for
reversal, cannot be brushed aside as immaterial, since there is a real chance that it might have
provided the slight impetus which swung the scales toward guilt.
315 U.S. at 67.
49. See text accompanying notes 96 & 102 infra.
50. In Glasser the trial court was extensively criticized for "embarrassing" counsel and for not
fulfilling its duty to protect the defendant's rights. 315 U.S. at 71-72.
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conflicts of interest at the outset of trial.51 Other circuits have rejected this
approach.52
All these issues were ripe for resolution due to the increasing number
of appeals taken upon them and the deepening divisions throughout the
lower courts. Even so, the case of Holloway v. Arkansas might be
considered an unlikely choice for the Supreme Court finally to grant
certiorari in a multiple representation case, because it did not directly raise
all these issues. This may be precisely why this case was chosen as a vehicle
to give guidance. The case permitted the Supreme Court to address some
of the more pressing aspects of multiple representation without
reexamining all the rules relating to it. Further development of the law by
lower courts, even in the areas left unchanged by Holloway, will be affected
by the decision's implications.53
III. ANALYSIS OF THE HOLDINGS
The Supreme Court in Holloway clearly stated that joint representa-
tion alone does not necessarily violate the defendants' sixth amendment
rights.54 The Court found support for this statement in Glasser v. United
States. The Court's holding reaffirming Glasser was not surprising, since,
in the face of repeated argument on policy grounds, no court had ever
reached the conclusion that the sixth amendment requires separate
representation.55
The rejection of a per se rule could be criticized because of the
problems inherent in multiple representation, but this holding can be
justified in light of other strides taken in Holloway. The Burger Court, in
its much commented upon approach,56 simply chose a case by case means
of dealing with these recurring problems.
A. The Narrow "Holloway Inquiry"
The Supreme Court found that the public defender's representations
of a possible conflict of interest were sufficient in this case to warrant a
hearing on the matter. Failure of the trial court to hold such a hearing was
found to warrant reversalY. Chief Justice Burger, writing for the majority,
rested this holding on the narrowest basis possible. The Court held that if
defense counsel raises a timely objection concerning conflicts resulting
51. See note 174 infra.
52. See note 175 infra.
53. See text accompanying notes 116-90 infra.
54. 435 U.S. at 482.
55. The writer's research has disclosed no such case. See cases collected in. CooK,supra note 5,
§ 46 n.94 holding that joint representation is not defective in itself.
56. Legal articles examining the Burger Court's manner of dealing with criminal justice matters
have been numerous. See, e.g., George, Doctrinal Doldrums: The Supreme Court's 1976 Criminal Law
Decisions, 68 J. CraM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 469 (1977); Israel, Crinnal Procedure, The BTrger Court
and the Legacy of the Warren Court, 75 MICH. L. REv. 1320 (1977).
57. 435 U.S. at 488.
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from joint representation of codefendants, then the trial court must either
appoint separate counsel or further explore this claim of conflict. The
Court stated:
The judge then failed either to appoint separate counsel or to take adequate
steps to ascertain whether the risk was too remote to warrant separate
counsel. We hold that the failure, in the face of representations made by
counsel weeks before trial and again before the jury was empanelled, deprived
petitioners of the guarantee of "assistance of counsel." 58
The dissenting opinion objected to this narrow holding. That opinion,
authored by Justice Powell, expressed concern that "the Court's opinion
contains seeds of a per se rule of separate representation merely upon the
demand of defense counsel."59 This concern seems well founded, in light of
the implications of the majority opinion.
The requirement of a conflict of interest hearing upon timely
objection could very well collapse into a rule of separate counsel upon
demand, due to the difficulty of holding a meaningful inquiry without
violating the ethical demands of confidentiality imposed upon an
attorney.60 The majority acknowledged that any inquiry into the
remoteness of the risk of conflict must be limited. Ajudge can require some
disclosure of the facts leading to the attorney's conflict of interest
objections, 6t but a point can be reached at which "disclosure creates
significant risks of unfair prejudice., 62 Any "Holloway inquiry" is thus
limited and by necessity shallow.
If attorneys in a conflict situation were forced to make known the
reasons behind their disabling problem, they would be compelled in many
instances to relate to the judge that one or more of the defendants had
admitted guilt or other incriminating facts.63 This information by its very
nature may influence the trial judge and thus cannot properly be
compelled. 4 There are dangers even when defendants are being tried
before a jury, because, as in Holloway, the judge may be required to
sentence the defendants. 65 The dissent correctly indicated that because
58. Id. at 484.
59. Id. at 491 (Powell, J., dissenting).
60. See ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY D.R. 4-101.
61. Under ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY D.R. 4-01(C)(2), an attorney may
reveal confidences when required by court order. The majority indicated that such a court order is not
proper under the circumstances presented by Holloway, 435 U.S. at 487 n.I I.
62. Id.
63. E.g., People v. Singh, 123 Cal. App. 365, 11 P.2d 73 (1932).
64. ABA STANDARDS, THE FUNCTION OF THE TRIAL JUDOE, supra note 24, § 5.8 (1974), provides:
Duty ofjudge to respect attorney-client relationship.
The trial judge should respect the obligation of counsel to refrain from speaking on privileged
matters and should avoid putting him in a position where his adherencct to the obligation, such as by
a refusal to answer, may tend to prejudice his client. Unless the privilege is waived, the trial judge
should not request counsel to comment on evidence or other matters %, here his knowledge is likely to
be gained from privileged communications.
65. See Holloway v. State, 260 Ark. 250, 269,539 S.W.2d 435,466 (1976) (Byrd, ,, dissenting),
Vol. 40:251
MULTIPLE REPRESENTATION
counsel can raise the shield of confidentiality, inquiry may often be
blecked.66
Neither the dissent nor the majority can suggest an effective means for
dealing with this inherent problem created by the attorney-client
privilege. 67 Justice Powell in his dissent did suggest that disclosure under
the Freedom of Information Act68 may be analogous. 69 He was apparently
suggesting that full disclosure by defense counsel of the basis of the conflict
claim be made to the judge in camera.70 This analogy does not seem
appropriate. In Freedom of Information Act cases, unlike conflict of
interest cases, trial judges are in no way prejudiced by making inspections
of documents to determine if they should be released. The trial judge in a
conflict case clearly has a duty to respect the attorney-client privilege.7
In some instances, information concerning the claimed conflict can be
gained without going into confidential information,72 but in others *a
separate attorney should be appointed based upon counsel's represen-
tations alone. The majority intended to place a heavy reliance upon
defense counsel's representations at the hearing. This reliance seems well
placed, in light of four considerations pointed out by the majority:
(1) Defense attorneys have the ethical duty to immediately bring a con-
flict problem to the attention of the trial court,73
(2) Attorneys are officers of the court and because of this their
representations are almost the equivalent of being under oath;
74
(3) Courts will still be able to deal with attorneys who claim a conflict for
dilatory or other improper purposes;
75
(4) Most courts in the past have automatically granted a separate attorney
when requested to do so, because an attorney is in the best position to
determine if a conflict exists.76
This last point somewhat diminishes the significance of this increased
reliance upon defense attorneys, because, in effect, it means that the Court
is merely standardizing the majority rule so that it is applicable in all cases.
The Court stated that "[m]ost courts have held that an attorney's request
for the appointment of counsel, based on his representations as an officer
66. Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 493 (1978) (Powell, J., dissenting).
67. The scope of the attorney-client privilege has been the subject of many cases. See generally 3
F. WHARTON, WHARTON'S CRIMINAL EVIDENCE §§ 556-561 (13th ed. C. Torcia 1973 & Supp. 1977).
68. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1976).
69. 435 U.S. at 493 n.1 (Powell, J., dissenting).
70. See cases collected in Note, National Security and the Public's Right to Know. A New Role
for the Courts Under the Freedom of Information Act, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1438 (1975).
71. See note 64 supra.
72. E-g., Commonwealth v. Lafleur, I Mass. App. Ct. 327, 296 N.E.2d 517 (1973).
73. 435 U.S. at 486 n.8.
74. Id. at 486. See also ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY D.R. 1-102, which provides
in part: "(A) A lawyer shall not .... (4) Engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or
misrepresentation. (5) Engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice."
75. 435 U.S. at 486-87.
76. Id. at 485.
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of the court regarding a conflict of interests, should be granted." 7 The
Court was unable to cite much case law to support this contention,"' but
there appear to be few cases to the contrary.
The one case cited by the Court as requiring continued joint
representation after a motion for appointment of separate counsel was
Commonwealth v. Lafleur.7 9 This case, however, rather than being
overturned by Holloway, could possibly serve as a model of how a
"Holloway-type" inquiry should be conducted. In Lafleur an attorney was
forced to continue representing joint defendants, but only after an in
camera disclosure of the conflicting interests.80 The procedure would seem
to comport with Holloway because the trial judge made an inquiry into the
nature of the conflict without requiring disclosure of confidential
communications. 81 The trial judge stated that the situation described "does
not strike me as being a conflict of sufficient dimension or weight to require
the appointment of separate counsel. 82 There are other cases in which a
court has refused to appoint separate attorneys, 83 but they appear to be a
decided minority.
84
Lafleur does raise the issue of what showing must be made to establish
that a conflict of interest exists. While there are many appellate standards
for determining if a conflict is of sufficient magnitude to warrant reversal, 8
there are no real guidelines for a trial judge's decision in this preliminary
inquiry. The majority in Holloway indicated that separate counsel should
not be appointed if "the risk was too remote"86 or if the hearing"disclosed
information demonstrating the insubstantiality"87  of an attorney's
representations. Aside from this slight guidance, the determination seems
to lie almost completely within the trial judge's discretion." A more
definitive standard is necessary; one can hope that it will develop as more
cases fill in the gaps in the Holloway decision.
The dissenting opinion indicated disapproval of this limited inquiry
procedure. 89 The dissent's principal concern focused on the great reliance
placed upon the defense counsel's representations that a conflict exists.
The dissent predicted that leaving this determination in the hands of the
77. Id.
78. The court cited Shuttle v. Smith, 296 F. Supp. 1315 (D. Vt. 1969); State v. Davis, 110 Ariz,
29, 514 P.2d 1025 (1973); State v. Brazile, 226 La. 254, 75 So. 2d 856 (1954).
79. 1 Mass. App. Ct. 327, 296 N.E. 2d 517 (1973).
80. Id. at 330, 296 N.E.2d at 519.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. E.g., People v. Buck, 6 App. Div. 2d 528, 179 N.Y.S. 2d K07 (1968).
84. See Note, supra note 42, at 385-86.
85. See text accompanying notes 165-72 infra.
86. 435 U.S. at 484.
87. Id. at 484 n.7.
88. See cases cited at note 121 infra.
89. 435 U.S. at 493 (Powell, J., dissenting).
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defendants and their attorney will lead to disruption within trial courts.9°
The dissent in expressing this fear seemed to accept the argument made by
the State of Arkansas that the determination whether a separate attorney
should be appointed must lie solely with the trial court and should not be
made by defense counsel.9' The majority, for the reasons discussed earlier,
did not share this view.
B. Harmless Error and Prejudice
In Holloway, although there were some obvious inconsistencies in the
testimony of the codefendants, it was not clear that any of the three were
prejudiced by theirjoint representation. In fact, the dissent stated that"this
is not a case where an inquiry into the possibility of 'conflicting interests'
reasonably might have revealed a basis for separate representation."92 The
majority never reached this issue, however, because it held that the
harmless error rule does not apply in this situation.93 When a conflict claim
is raised, reversal is automatic on appeal if the trial judge has taken no
action to appoint separate counsel or to inquire into the need for such
appointment.
The Supreme Court in Glaser v. United States stated that "[t]he right
to have the assistance of counsel is too fundamental and absolute to allow
courts to indulge in nice calculations as to the amount of prejudice arising
from its denial." 94 This language was interpreted by some courts to mean
that when a sixth amendment violation of effective assistance of counsel
was shown, reversal automatically followed without a further showing.9'
Other courts required a second showing beyond conflict of interest-
prejudice.96 A third group of cases used the terminology "conflict of
interest" and "prejudice" interchangeably so that it is difficult to ascertain
exactly what analysis they had gone through.
Prior to 1967 it had been assumed that any constitutional violation
demanded automatic reversal in other areas of the law.98 Prejudice was
required to be shown by some courts in multiple representation cases,
90. Id. at 494 n.2 (Powell, J., dissenting).
91. See Brief for Respondent at 14-22, Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475 (1978).
92. Id. at 496 n.5 (Powell, J., dissenting).
93. Id. at 488.
94. 315 U.S. 60, 75-76 (1942).
95. On this point see the authorities cited by the Supreme Court in Holloway. 435 U.S. at 487.
See also Foxworth v. Wainwright, 516 F.2d 1073, 1077 n.7 (5th Cir. 1975); Commonwealth v. Smith,
362 Mass. 782, 291 N.E.2d 607 (1973); State v. Davis, 110 Ariz. 29, 514 P.2d 1025 (1973).
96. On this point seethe authorities cited by the Supreme Courtin Holloway. 435 U.S. at487-88.
See also United States v. Morrow, 537 F 2d 120, 145 (5th Cir. 1976); Lollar v. United States, 376 F.2d
243 (D.C. Cir. 1967); In re Watson, 6 CaL 3d 831,494 P.2d 1264 (1972); Statev. Oliver, 23 Ohio App. 2d
210, 262 N.E.2d 424 (1970).
97. See, e.g., United States v. Lovano, 420 F.2d 769,773 (2d Cir. 1970); Washington v. Kennedy,
8 Wash. App. 633,508 P.2d 1386 (1973); United States v. Carrigan, 543 F.2d 1053,1055 (2d Cir. 1976).
98. See Field, Assessing the Harmlessness of Federal Constitutional Error-A Process in Need
of a Rationale, 125 U. PA. L. REv. 15 (1976).
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however, even before the harmless error doctrine was established by the
Supreme Court in Chapman v. California99 at that time. The Supreme
Court made it clear in Chapman that some errors in criminal proceedings
are harmless and thus do not warrant reversal, but required "the
beneficiary of a constitutional error to prove beyond a reasonable doubt
that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained."'00
Other evidence within the case is viewed to see if the constitutional
violation could have changed the outcome before an average jury. If it
could not, the verdict is affirmed.' 01
Thus, using the harmless error doctrine and the concept of prejudice,
a reviewing court could determine that a conflict of interest existed in a
multiple representation case sufficient to violate a defendant's sixth
amendment guarantee of effective assistance of counsel, yet not reverse the
lower court conviction. 0 2 The Supreme Court in Holloway, however, held
that this approach was incorrect under the circumstances, stating that
"whenever a trial court improperly requires joint representation over
timely objection reversal is automatic."' 0 3
The majority took precautions to limit its holding to the factual
situation presented, qualifying its' holding to apply only when timely
objection is overruled, forcing continued conflict-plagued representation.
The majority found some case support for creation of this exception, 10 4 but
appears to have been motivated primarily by policy considerations. The
majority's reasoning seems sound because it is very difficult for appellate
courts to review conflict claims in a uniform manner.10 5 Often an attorney's
ineffectiveness in a multiple representation situation will not be displayed
on the record, because the damage results from an omission provoked by
the conflict. 06 Only with automatic reversal could the inquiry that the
court required earlier in the opinion become a meaningful safeguard.
C. Waiver
The Supreme Court in Holloway did not directly address the issue of
waiver. The majority commented only in passing that a reading of Glasser
v. United States leads one to the conclusion "that a defendant may waive
his right to the assistance of an attorney unhindered by a conflict of
interest."'0 7 This would seem to be an uncontroversial statement, because
all courts had apparently permitted a "knowing and voluntary waiver."'
08
99. 386 U.S. 18 (1967).
100. Id. at 24.
101. Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250 (1969).
102. E.g., People v. Deshannon, 11 Cal. App. 3d 982,90 Cal. Rptr. 300 (1970), cert, denledsub,
norn. Suggs v. Comstock, 404 U.S. 833 (1971).
103. 435 U.S. at 488.
104. See text accompanying notes 145-47 infra.
105. 435 U.S. at 490-91.
106. Id. at 490.
107. Id. at 483 n.5.
108. See Dix, Waiver in Criminal Procedure: A Brieffor More Careful Analysis, 54 TEXAS L.
REV. 193 (1977), for an overview of the entire area of waiver.
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An earlier Supreme Court case 09 had guaranteed the defendant the right
to proceed without counsel' Holloway's passing reference to waiver is,
however, the Supreme Court's only explicit endorsement of waiver injoint
representation cases.1t l
Recognition of this right of waiver may create a problem, in part
because of the language employed by the Court in Holloway. The Court
would have no apparent problems with a trial court permitting a clearly
conflict-plagued representation to continue if there is a bona fide waiver.
Some commentators had argued prior to Holloway that there is no
absolute right to waive the sixth amendment guarantee of effective
assistance of counsel when there is multiple representation."1 The point
has been made that defendants have no right to the "defective assistance of
counser" 12 and thus cannot waive their rights in the face of a clear conflict
of interest.
One court has unequivocally stated that "defendants are not entitled
to joint representation as a matter of right."' 13 Some cases in this area have
spoken of a need to balance the public benefits of an efficient and effective
criminal justice system against a defendant's choice of a lawyer.tl 4 At least
three courts have taken the initiative in the face of a conflict of interest and
ordered substitution of counsel over a defendant's protests."' While the
reference in Holloway to waiver cannot be read to overrule these prior
cases, it may preclude future court action under similar circumstances.
That result would be extremely unfortunate, because such actions further
the ends of justice and should not be curtailed without more direct
Supreme Court consideration.
IV. IMPLICATIONS OF Holloway
The Supreme Court focused narrowly upon the timely pretrial
objections made by defendants' appointed counsel in resolving the
Holloway case. This factual situation allowed the case to be decided
without the necessity of examining some of the more troublesome multiple
representation issues. Defendants were not contesting their representation
for the first time on appeal. Moreover, the Court was not forced to
scrutinize defense counsers duties in the face of a conflict of interest,
because the attorney here had entered proper timely objection.
Even though the Supreme Court limited its discussion greatly, there is
109. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975).
110. Holloway has already been cited frequently to support waiver in multiple representation
cases. See, e.g., United States v. Cox, 580 F.2d317, 320 (8th Cir. 1978); United States v. Waldman, 579
F.2d 649 (1st Cir. 1978).
111. See Comment, supra note 6, at 250.
112. See generally Bazelon, The Defective Assistance of Counsel, U. CIN. L. REv. 1 (1973).
113. Abraham v. United States, 549 F.2d 236, 239 (2d Cir. 1977).
114. E.g., United States ex rel. Cary v. Rundle, 409 F.2d 1210, 1214 (3rd Cir. 1969); In re
Investigation Before April 1975 Grand Jury, 403 F. Supp. 1176, 1180 (D.D.C. 1975), vacatedon other
grounds, 531 F.2d 600 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
115. United States v. Vargas-Martinez, 569 F.2d 1102, 1104 (9th Cir. 1978); United States v.
Dolan, 570 F.2d 1177 (3rd Cir. 1978); United States v. Bernstein, 533 F.2d 775,787-89 (2d Cir. 1976).
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much outside the narrow holdings that is worthy of examination. There
are implications from the opinion that could have a great effect upon the
sixth amefidment guarantee of effective assistance of counsel as it applies
to multiple representation. It must be admitted that the scope and
significance of Holloway are difficult to gauge because of uncertainties
within the decision that can be cleared up only through subsequent
Supreme Court decisions, or more likely, through lower court interpreta-
tion. Many lower courts have already addressed Holloway. Their diverse
views of the case cast light upon its eventual effect.1 6 To fully understand
this area of the law it is necessary to go beyond the case's narrow holdings
and examine the related cases that will shape the broader consequences
of Holloway.
A. The Importance of Timely Objection After Holloway
The Supreme Court's opinion in Holloway specifically avoided
discussion of midtrial objections. Both the majority' and the dissent 18
limited the requirement of a conflict of interest hearing to cases concerning
timely pretrial objections to joint representation.
The dissent expressed concern over adoption of even a limited hearing
requirement, fearing that this new inquiry would be abused.' 9 One must
admit the possibility that the representation hearing could be used as a tool
for delay. The dissent's concern regarding disruption is particularly apt in
the context of midtrial objections, because in such cases a recess must be
granted during the trial to permit a new attorney to become familiar with
the case. To declare a mistrial might provoke double jeopardy problems. 120
Continuances in similar midtrial situations have been held to be within the
discretion of the trial court,1 21 with great deference given to its
determination. 1
22
The dissent indicated that it would require a greater showing of
conflict to sustain an objection that is not raised before trial. The dissent
stated that "a later motion may be appropriate if the conflict is not known
or does not become apparent before trial proceeds. To guard against
strategic disruption of the trial, however, the court may require a
substantial showing of justification for such midtrial motions."123
116. Most of the federal circuit courts have already cited Holloway; such subsequent cases are
cited at notes 30, 32, 110 supra, and notes 150-52, 158-62, 172, 174-75 infra.
117. 435 U.S. at484 n.7.
118. Id. at 495 n.4. (Powell, J., dissenting). See text accompanying note 123 infra.
119. Id. at 494 n.2. (Powell, J., dissenting).
120. See Crist v. Bretz. 437 U.S. 28 (1978); Note, United States v. Walden: Double Jeopardy and
the Mistrial, 34 U.Pirr. L. REv. 714 (1973); Annot., 49 A.L.R. 3d 1039 (1973).
121. E.g., United States v. Bunton, 584 F.2d 485, 491-92 (D.C. Cir. 1978); United States v.
Dardi, 330 F.2d 316 (2d Cir. 1964); Arellanes v. United States, 302 F.2d 603 (9th Cir. 1962).
122. E.g., Ungar v. Sanafite, 376 U.S. 575 (1964); United States v. Riebold, 557 F.2d 697, 702
(10th Cir. 1977); People v. Mason, 91 111. App. 2d 118, 234 N.E.2d 351 (1968).
123. 435 U.S. at 495 n.4. (Powell, J., dissenting).
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Although the dissenters gave no illustrations of what would constitute "a
substantial showing of justification," it seems clear that they wish to
require much more than the pretrial inquiry discussed in Holloway.2 4
Once again, however, there appears to be no meaningful way to require
such a showing without encountering problems of confidentiality. 2
The problem of midtrial objections could be solved by forbidding
them entirely. An attorney could be forced to raise all his objections
concerning joint representation before trial, or forego them altogether.
This is not, however, a realistic approach. One district court has
acknowledged that "unfortunately, no matter how thorough an attorney's
investigation, he may not be aware of those facts which suggest the
possibility of a conflict."'126 Thus, a conflict of interest may not materialize
until well into trial. Discord arising late in the trial, if not alleviated by
appointment of separate counsel, may lead to an ethical dilemma:
Ironically, once divided loyalties and conflicts arise, the more joint counsel
tries to remain faithful to the goal of full representation, the more heseems to
reduce the probability of obtaining relief on appeal; in attempting to
eliminate potentially prejudicial inconsistenies in his clients' defenses, he
may produce a record barren of recognizable conflict, thereby frustrating all
but the most extensive efforts of appellate speculation. 2 7
In light of this problem and because of possibly different showings of
conffict that must be met depending upon the time a claim of conflict is
raised, 12 an attorney representing codefendents should routinely propose
at the outset that separate counsel be obtained. Some courts may not grant
such a motion because they consider the potential conflict too remote.1 9
Even when the motion is denied, however, two purposes are served. First,
reviewing courts are alerted that the defendants have not waived their sixth
amendment guarantee of effective assistance of counsel.130 Second, the
defense lawyer makes it clear that he or she has met ethical responsibilities
concerning conflicts of interest.'
Attorneys must be more careful representing multiple defendants
after Holloway because the Supreme Court has to some extent shifted the
burden of discovering and avoiding conflicts of interest from the trial judge
to the defense practitioner. 32 The Court not only held that an attorney's
representations alone often will be enough to cause separate ap-
124. See text accompanying notes 57-62 supra.
125. See text accompanying notes 63-71 supra.
126. United States v. Garafola, 428 F. Supp. 620, 625 (D. NJ. 1977).
127. Comment, supra note 42, at 382-83.
128. See, e.g., Austin v. Erikson, 477 F.2d 620, 623 (8th Cir. 1973).
129. Eg., United States v. Williams, 429 F.2d 158 (8th Cir. 1970).
130. The timely objection in Holloway precluded any appellate review of the issue of waiver.435
U.S. at 483 n.5.
131. See notes 35-36 supra.
132. Several legal articles have called for such a shift in responsibility. K-g., Judd, Conflicts of
Interest-A Trial Judge's Notes, 44 FORDHAM L. REv. 1097 (1976).
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pointments, but also seemed to indicate that ethical considerations will be
taken into account more frequently in the future. The majority cited
American Bar Association Standards Relating to the Administration of
Criminal Justice on three occasions 13 3 and both the majority134 and the
dissent 135 cited the American Bar Association Code of Professional
Responsibility.
The United States District Court for the District of New Jersey had,
prior to Holloway, relied upon such ethical rules in the case of United
States v. Garafola.136 That case put the responsibility of dealing with
conflicts upon the practicing bar because "the trial judge cannot conduct a
meaningful inquiry."1 37 The court in Garafola established a prospective
rule to govern its district. Under this rule, a defense attorney representing
more than one defendantwill be required to disclaim any possibility of a
conflict of interest at the outset ofjudicial proceedings. 138 A proposed form
for the disclaimer was included in-an appendix to the decision; it clearly
delineates the attorney's ethical responsibilities.1 39  Most criminal
practitioners probably would not take a chance in representing multiple
defendants under this system. Should an attorney proceed with joint
representation and a conflict arise, then the court in Garafola clearly
provides that "disciplinary measures should be pursued by the offended
trial judge."'' 40 Theoretically, even those conflicts not foreseeable at the
outset would lead to a reprimand of the attorney. This comes very near, in
practice, to a per se rule requiring separate attorneys. Although the
Supreme Court did not go this far in Holloway, other lower courts might
now follow the Garafola approach.
Such a rule would touch many attorneys who would otherwise remain
unaffected by the Supreme Court's narrow holdings in Holloway. The
facts of Holloway allowed the Justices to be more concerned with
disruptive demands, and less concerned with attorneys who blindly
continue representation of multiple defendants in a conflict of interest
sitliation. 4 ' This latter problem occurs because attorneys are either
unaware of the ethical danger inherent in representing more than one
defendant 142 or disregard such ethical considerations for financial or other
reasons. Alan Y. Cole, while Chairman of the American Bar Association,
Section of Criminal Justice, was openly critical of the bar's behavior in this
133. 435 U.S. at 480 n.4; 483-84 n.6; 486 n.8.
134. Id. at487 n.11.
135. Id. at 494 n.2. (Powell, J., dissenting).
136. 428 F. Supp. 620 (D. N.J. 1977).
137. Id. at 626.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 628.
140. Id. at 626.
141. See generally Geer, supra note 5.
142. See Burbank & Duboff, Ethics and the Legal Profession: A Survey of Boston Lawyers, 9
SUFFOLK L. REv. 66, 91-96 (1974).
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area. 143 He indicated that the guarantee of effective assistance of counsel
was being ignored by attorneys who chose to pursue their own best
interests and not those of their clients. 44 Regrettably, Holloway does not
address this larger problem, although it may make some attorneys more
aware of their professional responsibilities in this area.
B. Implications of the Harmless Error Holding
1. Scope of This Holding
In spite of the Supreme Court's efforts to limit its holding, Holloway
has harmless error implications beyond the specific type of forced joint
representation present before the Court. The Court's reasoning has
application throughout the entire area of multiple representation. The
Court relied heavily upon language from Glaser v. United States that
contained no limiting provisions. Glaser had indicated that no "nice
calculations" respecting prejudice were to be made throughout all
ineffective assistance of counsel cases.145 In addition, the Holloway Court
quoted Chapman v. California,146 stating that "this Court has concluded
that the assistance of counsel is among those'constitutional rights so basic
to a fair trial that their ififraction can never be treated as harmless
error.'" "147 These cases would appear to be just as easily cited in other
multiple representation situations as in the one presented by Holloway.
The majority opinion in its concluding paragraph indicated the
practical reasons why a showing of harmless error should not be required.
The Court stated:
In the normal case where a harmless error rule is applied, the error occurs at
trial and its scope is readily identifiable. Accordingly, the reviewing court can
[undertake] with some confidence its relatively narrow task of assessing the
likelihood that the error materially affected the deliberations of the jury.
...But in a case of joint representation or conflicting interests the evil-it
bears repeating-is in what the advocate finds himself compelled to refrain
from doing, not only at trial but also as to possible pretrial plea negotiations
143. Cole made these points in a speech given at a commencement dinner at the National College
of Criminal Defense Lawyers and Public Defenders in Houston, Texas on June 24, 1976. An article
adapted from this speech appears in Cole, Time for a Change: Multiple Representation Should Be
Stopped, 2 NAT'L J. CRim. DEF. 149 (1976).
144. Id. at 149. Cole states:
The representation of several persons in a single criminal proceeding is the answer to a
defense lawyer's dream. A larger fee is justified because the clients can pool their resources.
Often, their bill will be paid by someone else.
Even when fee considerations are not involved, there are advantages to this practice. By
representing numerous defendants, there is a better chance to learn the facts, for rather than
being forced to rely upon the spotty memory of a single client, details can be cross-checked
with all of them. Indeed, with a little ingenuity, an investigation can often be stopped dead in
its tracks.
145. 315 U.S. 60, 76 (1943).
146. 386 U.S. 18, 23 (1967).
147. 435 U.S. at 489.
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and in the sentencing process. . . . Thus, an inquiry into a claim of harmless
error here would require, unlike*most cases, unguided speculation. 148
This reasoning seems as pertinent to multiple representation that is not
forced upon counsel as it does to the Holloway facts.
The scope of the Court's holding regarding harmless error is subject to
extension into two areas. It could be extended to all conflict cases, even
those in which timely objection is not made, or it could become applicable
in all effective assistance of counsel cases including those not concerned
with joint representation. The reasoning and the case law seem to dictate
that the holding be extended to all multiple representation cases that
present conflicts of interest.
The Eighth Circuit has already addressed the scope of the Court's
holding in this area. Reynolds v. Mabry149 dealt with a sixth amendment
ineffective assistance of counsel claim alleging incompetency of trial
counsel. The Sixth and Ninth Circuits had previously ruled that the
harmless error doctrine did not apply in such cases.1 50 The Eighth Circuit
did not follow the lead of those circuits, however, retaining a harmless
error analysis outside of multiple representation cases.
The Eighth Circuit found Holloway relevant to this matter but not
dispositive. The court stated that even though "the Supreme Court's recent
decision in Holloway v. Arkansas, supra, may be viewed as supportive of
the results reached by the Sixth and Ninth Circuits, the effect of the case
may be limited to conflict of interest situations." 151 The court went on to
cite the concluding paragraph of the majority's opinion to substantiate this
contention. 152
The Eighth Circuit's analysis appears correct. One district court has
construed the Holloway holding even more narrowly, but still held that no
harmless error analysis need be made. That court stated:
The Glasser and Holloway decisions, narrowly construed, authorize a per se
standard of review only where the trial court has played an instrumental role
in a conflict of interest affecting appointed counsel's representation-either
by compelling counsel to undertake the defense of codefendants whose
interests are in conflict or by permitting a conflict-ridden representation to
continue after being placed on notice of the problem. But the lower federal
courts have not limited the application of the per se rule in the concurrent
representation context.1
53
It appears that Holloway will lend support to defense arguments in all
joint representation cases, so that they will automatically be reversed when
148. Id. at 490-91.
149. 574 F.2d 978 (8th Cir. 1978).
150. Beasley v. United States, 491 F.2d 687,696 (6th Cir. 1974); Cooperv. Fitzharris, 551 F.2d
1162 (9th Cir. 1977). But see Cooper v. Fitzharris, 586 F.2d 1325 (9th Cir. 1978).
151. Reynolds v. Mabry, 574 F.2d 978, 981 (8th Cir. 1978). But see Commonwealth v. Badger,
393 A.2d. 642 (1978).
152. 574 F.2d at 981 n.5.
153. Stephans v. United States, 453 F. Supp. 1202, 1208 (M.D. Fla. 1978).
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a conflict of constitutional dimension is shown. That this change can be
crucial for appellate review is demonstrated by Holloway itself.
Defendants were unable to make a clear factual demonstration of
prejudice, yet their convictions were reversed. There are no indications
that one of the defendants, Welch, was in any way detrimentally affected
by the joint representation. The dissent focused upon this lack of support
for a finding of reversal in this case and did not directly counter the
majority's position on automatic reversal.154 The Court did make it clear
that each defendant must raise his own sixth amendment challenge. 55
Codefendants cannot claim that violation of another defendant's
constitutional rights requires reversal of their conviction.
2. Continued Use of the Term "Prejudice"
Prior to Holloway there was much confusion over the role prejudice
plays in a conflict case. 5 6 This confusion was the result of the
interchangeable use of the phrase "conflict of interest" and the word
"prejudice." Prejudice, in the sense that a procedural error changes the
outcome of the case, is no longer at issue in the Holloway factual situation.
Nevertheless prejudice, in terms of detriment to a defendant's case due to
multiple representation, clearly remains a relevant consideration and
is not presumed.'57
The Eighth Circuit correctly interpreted the concept of prejudice
when it stated:
In Holloway, the Court held that where a trial court improperly required joint
representation there can be no harmless error. In that case the court was
concerned with whether a constitutional violation was subject to the harmless
error rule. Here, the question is whether there was a constitutional violation.
Under the rule articulated in Holloway, prejudice will be assumed when there
is ineffective assistance of counsel, but ineffective assistance will not be
inferred solely from the fact of joint representation. 58
At least three courts, however, have spoken of prejudice even though
they have cited Holloway. A Second Circuit case decided shortly after
Holloway was remanded "for reconsideration of the issue of prejudice." 59
That court was certainly aware of the Supreme Court's decision in this area
because it noted that both the prosecution and defense had filed
"supplementary comments on its relevance."' 60 The First"' and Sixth
154. 435 U.S. at 496 n.5 (Powell, J., dissenting).
155. Id. at 489.
156. See generally Comment, supra note 44, at 248; Comment, supra note 6, at 231.
157. See Perez v. Warden, 459 F. Supp. 1141 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
158. United States v. Cox,580 F.2d317,321 n.5 (8thcir. 1978);accord, United Statesv. Alvarez,
580 F.2d 1251, 1259 (5th Cir. 1978).
159. Salomon v. Lavallee, 575 F.2d 1051, 1055 (2d Cir. 1978).
160. Id. at 1053 n.3.
161. United States v. Dicarlo, 575 F.2d 952, 957 (1st Cir. 1978) ("relatively slight showing of
prejudice required").
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Circuits 162 have also spoken of a need for a showing of prejudice, although
citing Holloway within their decisions.
These courts have not spoken of making a second determination of
harmless error after a conflict has been found. They appear to be speaking
of the prejudice inherent within a conflict of interest situation. They seem
to make only one determination, that is, whether a conflict exists, but
include prejudice as a necessary part of their conflict of interest analysis.
The concept of prejudice, if used in this sense, does not contravene the
Holloway holding. All courts, even those that do not speak in terms of
prejudice, must find certain conflicts irrelevant or insignificant and thus of
not enough magnitude to create a sixth amendment problem. 63 When
prejudice is used to mean a significant conflict, it is a problem only because
of the confusion it creates. It would be preferable that all courts interpret
Holloway to require that the defendants need not speak of prejudice. One
court has already taken this approach. The Massachusetts Supreme Court
has stated that 't]he defendant suggests correctly that the violation of his
sixth amendment rights is established on the showing of a conflict, with no
requirement that resulting prejudice be proved."'164 Many courts, however,
may not read Holloway as mandating the complete disregard of prejudice.
These lower courts are content to perpetuate the confusion over the term
"prejudice" which has been present since Glaser.
C. Certainty of Conflict
The Supreme Court specifically reserved two issues in Holloway. The
first was "how strong a showing of conflict must be made, or how certain
the reviewing court must be that the asserted conflict existed, before it will
conclude that the defendants were deprived of their right to the effective
assistance of counsel." 165 Numerous and conflicting standards exist in this
area. Among them is the requirement that there must be "some factual
support ' 166 for a conflict claim. Another requirement is that "some specific
instance of prejudice, some real conflict of interest resulting from a joint
representation must be shown to exist."' 6 7 Other less demanding standards
call for only "informed speculation"'' 68 that a conflict exists, or a showing
of a "possible conflict of interest or prejudice, however remote."1 69
There are other standards and variations in wording, but the point is
162. United States v. Steele, 576 F.2d 111, 112 (6th Cir. 1978) ("A showing of prejudice is
necessary.").
163. See Foxworth v. Wainwright, 516 F.2d 1073, 1077 n.7 (5th Cir. 1975).
164. Commonwealth v. Bolduc, 378 N.E.2d 661, 667 (Mass. 1978).
165. 435 U.S. at 483.
166. Boehmer v. United States, 414 F. Supp. 766, 770 (E.D. Pa. 1976).
167. United States v. Lovano, 420 F.2d 769,773 (2d Cir. 1970); accord, Kaplan v. Bombard, 573
F.2d 708, 712, (2d Cir. 1978).
168. Lollar v. United States, 376 F.2d 243, 247 (D.C. Cir. 1967); accord, People v. Cook, 13 Cal,
App. 3d 663, 532 P.2d 148, 119 Cal. Rptr. 500 (1975).
169. Walker v. United States, 422 F.2d 374, 375 (3rd Cir. 1970); accord, United States ex tel.
Hart v. Davenport, 478 F.2d 203, 210 (3rd Cir. 1973).
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clear-a defendant's chances on appeal may hinge upon thejurisdiction in
which he is tried. Because the Court in Holloway made the important
determination that the attorney's representations alone were enough to
warrant reversal, it found it unnecessary to consider these divergent
standards.1 70 Nevertheless, it would be extremely helpful to have a
Supreme Court resolution of this divergence.
The Court's statements concerning forced joint representation and
harmless error could be taken as a rejection of the standards that require
that a factual basis be shown. 17 ' As one court reviewing Holloway has
noted, however, each jurisdiction must look to its own precedents in this
area. 172
D. Duty of the Trial Judge
The second issue specifically reserved by the Supreme Court dealt
with "the scope and nature of the affirmative duty of the trial judge to
assure that criminal defendants are not deprived of their right to the
effective assistance of counsel by joint representation of conflicting
interests."' 73 This issue has been dealt with more than any other multiple
representation issue by the lower courts in the past few years. Six United
States courts of appeals require the trial judges within their circuits to meet
specific requirements when defendants share an attorney.174 Judges may be
required to hold a hearing into the possibilities of conflict or, more simply,
detail the danger of such representation, making sure the defendants
understand these difficulties. Four courts of appeals impose no such
affirmative duty. 75 One circuit's highest court has apparently not dealt
with this issue. 76 Two excellent surveys of the differing approaches used by
170. 435 U.S. at 484.
171. But see United States ex rel. Ware v. Warden, No. 78 C 1916, Slip Opinion (N.D. Ill. Oct.
12, 1978).
172. Salamon v. Lavallee, 575 F.2d 1051, 1054 n.3 (2d Cir. 1978).
173. 435 U.S. at 483.
174. Cases holding that a trial judge does have an affirmative duty in this area include the
following within each circuit. D.C. Cir.: Campbell v. United States, 352 F.2d 359 (D.C Cir. 1965). 1st
Cir.: United States v. Foster, 469 F.2d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 1972); accord, United States v. Waldman, 579 F.2d
649, 651-52 (Ist Cir. 1978); United States v. Donahue, 560 F.2d 1039, 1943 (ist Cir. 1977). 2d Cir.:
United States v. Carrigan, 543 F.2d 1053, 1055 (2d Cir. 1976); accord, Salomon v. Lavallee, 575 F.2d
1051, 1055 (2d Cir. 1978); Abraham v. United States, 549 F.2d 236 (2d Cir. 1977). 3rd Cir.: United
States ex rel. Hart v. Davenport, 478 F.2d 203,211 (3rd Cir. 1973); accord, United States v. Levy, 577
F.2d 200,211 (3rd Cir. 1978). 4th Cir.: United States v. Truglio, 493 F.2d 574,579 (4th Cir. 1974); but
see United States v. Atkinson, 565 F.2d 1262, 1264 (4th Cir. 1977). 8th Cir.: United States v. Lawriw,
568 F.2d 98, 105 (8th Cir. 1977).
175. Cases holding that there is no affirmative duty imposed upon the trial judge within that
circuit include the following. 5th Cir.: United States v. Smith, 550 F.2d 277, 286 (5th Cir. 1977). 6th
Cir.: United States v. Steele, 576 F.2d 111, 112 (6th Cir. 1978). 7th Cir.: United States v. Mandell, 525
F.2d 671, 677 (7th Cir. 1975), cert denied, 423 U.S. 1049 (7th Cir. 1975); accord, United States v.
Kidding, 560 F.2d 1303,1310 (7th Cir. 1977). 9th Cir.: United States v. Christopher,488 F.2d 849,851
(9th Cir. 1973); but see United States v. Eaglin, 571 F.2d 1069, 1086 (9th Cir. 1977).
176. The writer's search has not disclosed a Tenth Circuit case directly addressing the duty ofthe
trialjudge in ajoint representation case. Dicta in United States v. Warledo, 557 F.2d 721,728 (10th Cir.
1977) would suggest that such a duty might possibly be imposed.
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the courts are contained in United States v. Lawriw177 and
the Advisory Committee Note to the Proposed Amendment of Rule 44(c)
of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 178 which extensively detail
the varied activity on this issue.
Proposed Rule of Federal Criminal Procedure 44(c) indicates the
direction that courts have been taking. It provides:
Rule 44. Right to and Assignment of Counsel
(c) JOINT REPRESENTATION. Whenever two or more defendants have
been jointly charged pursuant to Rule 8(b) or have been joined for trial
pursuant to Rule 13, and are represented by the same retained or assigned
counsel or by retained or assigned counsel who are associated in the practice
of law, the court shall promptly inquire with respect to such joint
representation and shall personally advise each defendant of his right to the
effective assistance of counsel, including separate representation. Unless it
appears that there is good cause to believe no conflict of interest is likely to
arise, the court shall take such measures as may be appropriate to protect
each defendant's right to counsel.
179
Adoption of the proposed rule would settle this issue within the federal
courts but leave it unresolved within state courts. Several states have,
however, begun to require such court inquiries. 80
If, however, this proposed rule is not adopted there is sentiment
expressed within Holloway to make an inquiry of this sort a requirement
stemming from the sixth amendment. The dissent stated that it would have
"followed the lead of the several Courts of Appeals that have recognized
the trial court's duty of inquiry injoint representation cases . . ."'" The
dissent also indicated that it would shift the burden of persuasion to the
Government if such an inquiry was not made. 182 The majority would seem
receptive to this idea, refusing to decide this issue only because the facts of
Holloway led them to their narrow holding concerning forced representa-
tion of multiple defendants. An inquiry requirement of the sort described
by the dissent appears inevitable, whether through the proposed rule or a
subsequent Supreme Court decision.
E. Effect Upon Public Defender Offices
The dissent expressed some concern that Holloway will lead to
disruption within public defender offices. 8 3 This concern is warranted
because public defenders appear to be the group most likely to invoke the
Hollowdy decision. One public defender is often appointed to represent
177. 568 F.2d 98 (8th Cir. 1977).
178. 98 S. Ct. No. 13, at 83 (1978).
179. Quoted in Salomon v. LaVallee, 575 F.2d 1051, 1054 (2d Cir. 1978).
180. E.g., State v. Olsen, 258 N.W.2d 898 (Minn. 1977); State v. Green, 129 N.J. Super. 157,322
A.2d 495 (1974).
181. 435 U.S. at 494 (Powell, J., dissenting).
182. Id. at 494-95 n.3 (Powell, J., dissenting).
183. Id. at 494 n.2 (Powell, J., dissenting).
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more than one defendant. The difficulty caused by Holloway is accented
because each public defender office typically serves a wide geographic
area. 184 Problems will be created when a public defender makes a
successful motion to have separate counsel appointed. The question of
who can be appointed to fill this void in representation is not easy to
answer.
Some prior case law has held that a public defender office should be
treated as equivalent to a law office for purposes of the American Bar
Association Code of Professional Responsibility.'8 5 Disciplinary Rule 5-
105(D) provides that "[i]f a lawyer is required to decline or withdraw from
employment . . . no partner of his or her firm may accept or continue
such employment.' 6 This provision, if found to apply to a legal aid office,
would preclude anyone within that unit from representing a defendant
after a successful Holloway claim is made by another member of that
office. This result could create turmoil if one office serves a large city.
Although at least one case has held that a public defender office is not
to be considered a law firm for purposes of a conflict of interest, 8 7 this does
not seem a likely solution to the dilemma. t88 Other solutions should be
sought. One possibility would be to return to the older approach of
assigning counsel from throughout the legal community in such a
situation.'89 Partitioning of public defender offices into distinct individual
units would also be an option. Finally, working relationships could
possibly be created with other regional and state defender systems,' g9 so
that assistance could be obtained in conflict situations.
Unfortunately, Holloway gives no guidance on this troublesome
point. One must wonder where two or perhaps all three of the defendants
in Holloway turned to obtain counsel on remand, because their shared
attorney was affiliated with the Public Defender's Office for the Sixth
Judicial District of Arkansas.
V. CONCLUSION
Many important issues were left unresolved by Holloway, but the
decision did address some of the varied problems created by multiple
184. Wice & Pilgrim, Meeting the Gideon Mandate: A Survey of Public Defender Programs, 58
Juv. 401 (1975); Bonsai, The Criminal Justice Act-1964 to 1976. 52 IND. L.J. 135 (1976).
185. Eg., Allen v. The District Court in and for the Tenth Judicial District, 184 Colo. 202,519
P.2d 351(1974); Bordenv. Borden, 277 A.2d 89 (D.C. CL App. 1971). Turner v. State, 340 So. 2d 132
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976).
186. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPONSIBILrry D.RL 5-105(D). Seealso Webster, The Public
Defender, the Sixth Amendment, and the Code of Professional Responsibility: The Resolution of a
Ccnflict of Interest, 12 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 739 (1975).
187. People v. Wilkins, 28 N.Y.2d 53, 268 N.E.2d 756, 320 N.Y.S.2d 8 (1971).
188. See Comment, Public Defender's Office is a "'Law Firm"for Purpose of Determining
Whether Conflict Exists in Representation of Codefendants, 5 FLA. ST. U. L REv. 492 (1977).
189. See Allison, Relationship Between the Office of Public Defender andthe Assigned Counsel
System, 10 VAL. L. Rev. 399 (1976).
190. See Note, Statewide Public Defender Organization: An Appealing Alternative, 29 STAN L
REv. 157 (1976).
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representation of criminal defendants. The case will have an effect upon
four groups of people.
The first and most important group affected, future defendants, has
obtained additional safeguards. No longer can defendants' claims of
conflicts of interest go completely unanswered at trial. Upon objection by
counsel, trial judges, a second group concerned with these matters, must
appoint other attorneys, or inquire into the need for separate counsel. If
they fail to do so, a third body, the appellate courts, must automatically
reverse defendants' convictions.
The last of the four affected groups holds the key to the effectiveness of
this process. If defense attorneys do not at the outset review the joinder of
their clients to ascertain possible conflicts, problems will arise. Objections
not raised until midtrial or until appeal will not be met with the same
receptiveness by the courts.
A per se rule requiring each defendant to be represented by separate
counsel, would alleviate all problems in this area of the law. Such a
dramatic change, however, is not realistic at this time. The Supreme Court
did permit eventual achievement of a similar result by placing more
responsibility on the practicing bar.
If ethical responsibilities were strictly enforced, the number of
conflicts and the number of persons being represented jointly would be
greatly reduced. These practices would not be completely eliminated but
would be reduced to a controllable level. Thus, the answer may lie in local
trial court and appellate supervisory rules that do no more than strictly
enforce ethical standards and adhere to the American Bar Association
Standards for Criminal Justice. This appears to be the best way to use
Holloway to effectuate important changes in multiple representation
practice without enactment of new court or legislative rules.
Enactment of Proposed Rule of Criminal Procedure 44(c), which
would require an inquiry by all federal district courts in a multiple
representation situation, would also be a major step forward. It would
place more responsibility upon the trial judge and can easily be coupled
with increased responsibility upon attorneys. These two steps together
would be more effective than placing total responsibility for conflicts upon
either trial judges or attorneys alone.
There are no reasons why these changes can not come about, The
existing state of the law is allowed to continue due to the demands of
judicial economy and expense. Nevertheless, it would seem that the time
saved at trial is later lost because of the great number of appeals taken on
multiple representation issues. Judge Oakes of the Second Circuit, calling
for a reexamination of the rules concerningj oint representation, put it well
when he stated:
Trial court insistence that, except in extraordinary circumstances, codefen-
dants retain separate counsel will in the long run in my opinion prove salutary
not only to the administration of justice and the appearance ofjustice but the
[Vol. 40:251
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cost ofjustice; habeas corpus petitions, petitions for new trials, appeals and
occasionally retrials . . . can be avoided. Issues as to whether there is an
actual conflict of interest, whether the conflict has resulted in prejudice,
whether there has been a waiver, whether the waiver is intelligent and
knowledgeable, for example, can all be avoided. Where a conflict that first did
not appear subsequently arises in or before trial . . . continuances or
mistrials can be saved. Essentially by the time a case such as the present one
gets to the appellate level the harm to the appearance ofjustice has already
been done, whether or not reversal occurs; at the trial level it is a matter which
is so easy to avoid.191
Gary W. Spring
191. United States v. Mari, 526 F.2d 117, 121 (2d Cir. 1975) (Oakes, J., concurring).

